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The paper analyses the forces that have led to the NSW government's creation of another urban
development corporation in Sydney, the Redfern-Waterloo Authority. It firstly examines the concept of
New State Spaces as a primary mode of urban governance in the post-Fordist era, involving the
application of neo-liberalism to major urban projects using public-private partnerships. The paper then
reviews the use of urban development corporations by the NSW government since the 1960s as a
potential exemplar of new state spaces, and suggests reasons for the frequent adoption of such
corporations as a governance mechanism for urban development and redevelopment in Sydney. The
local conditions in inner city Redfern-Waterloo that have prompted the creation of the Authority are
then examined. After outlining the powers and roles of the Authority. the paper analyses the specific
political and institutional contexts that drove the decision to create the Authority at the end of 2004.
The extent to which the Authority illustrates the new state spaces thesis is analysed. Finally. possible
reasons for the unabated use of urban development corporations by the NSW government in relation to
their lessening use in other areas such as the UK are put forward.
INTRODUCTION
The role of the state in post-Fordist urban development has been subject to extensive analysis and
cntique. While the end of the welfare state might suggest that contemporary urban development is now
subject to less state control and to more market control. the reality is that the state's role has changed
but not lessened. Central to this has been the creation of inew state spaces' (Brenner 2004). involving
the production of new state forms at a more fragmented. localised level to facilitate the capture of
global accumulation via major urban projects based on the re-valorisation ofreal estate. This paper
discusses this rescaling of state space in the context of a new state space in Sydney, the Redfern-
Waterloo Authority.
URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS AND THE RESCALING OF STATE SPACE
The Fordist era of capitalism has been succeeded from the late 1970s by a post-Fordist era oft1exible
accumulation and intensified global competition for economic activity. This transition was paralleled
by corresponding shift in state organization and operation. The Fordist era was supported by a
Keynesian welfare state marked by administrative conformity, equalisation of state support,
centralisation, and scalar singularity (Brenner 2004, p. 106). With the end of the Long Boom. the
welfare state ran into a fiscal crisis, and support for a new neo-liberal fonn of governance grew. most
strongly in the Anglophone countries.
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The neo-liberal state has not simply 'rolled back' state functions to unleash market forces. Rather, new
forms of state-economy relations, including urban development corporations, have been constructed at
various spatial scales. These new fOnTIShave responded to two primary forces. Firstly, they have been
constructed to allow neo-liberal policies such as deregulation. privatisation and labour market
flexibility to guide urban development (Moulaert, Rodriguez and Swyngedouw 2003, p. 34). Secondly,
they have been seen as a means of capturing surplus value in the new era of increasing globalization of
the primary circuit of capital (Brenner 1997). New stronger forms of urban governance could allow the
'territorialisatiou' of surplus value realisation in the secondary circuit of landed property, by
channelling capital into the built environment to allow new elites to mine land rents (Brenner 1997). In
doing so. the new governance structures could also address the tax problems caused to local
government by the hyper-mobility of capital (Moulaert. Rodriguez and Swyngedouw 2003, p. 249).
Thus new state spaces have been produced. Brenner (2004. p. 106) has characterised their key features
as administrative customisation, differentiation, decentralisation. and scalar multiplicity. While this
rescaling can operate at the level of newly 'metropolitanised ' spatial planning policies (Brenner 2004.
pp. 218-219). the focus has been on rescaling to facilitate specific major urban development projects.
The new state fOnTIShere involve partnerships, privatisation of public funds. real estate development,
flagship projects, and spatial targeting and localisation (Moulaert, Rodriguez and Swyngedouw 2003,
p. 34). The particular fOnTIof rescaled state space is contingent and contested. The decentralisation
emphasis present in Europe was absent in the UK during the 1980s and 1990s: in the latter, new
market-oriented institutions such as urban development corporations and enterprise zones were
imposed by the central government. Overall, there is much variety in the form of new state spaces
between localities. This reflects the indeterminate character of neo-liberalism, and the hybrid. multiple
and contradictory of its political projects (Lamer 2003: McGuirk 2005).
The changed role of planning is critical to the operation of the new state spaces. involving new planing
methods, tools and institutions. The comprehensive plan of the Fordist age is set aside in favour of
controls favouring large, emblematic urban projects that allow targeted yet flexible planning while
providing high symbolic capacity (Moulaert, Rodriguez and Swyngedouw 2003, p. 248). The latter is
associated with an eclectic planning style where design and aesthetics are paramount. In general, the
major urban projects involve special plans and quasi-autonomous institutional structures that relegate
statutory norms and procedures to a subsidiary level. In this way the projects are part of the trend to a
new local mode of regulation of urban (re)development, involving shifts from traditional government
structures to a more diffused, fragmented and flexible mode of governance (Moulaert, Rodriguez and
Swyngedouw 2003, p. 264).
At the same time the by-passing of traditional democratic accountability mechanisms means that the
new governance structures for urban development have significant downsides. The leveraging of state
land and infrastructure usually cause privati sat ion of proj ect benefits in favour of elite investors
(Moulaert, Rodriguez and Swyngedouw 2003, pp. 40, 250). There is a diminished role for the public in
general. Urban development project-based strategies can act as an exclusion mechanism for deprived
communities (Moulaert, Rodriguez and Swyngedouw 2003, p. 43). They show a significant deficit
regarding accountability, representation, and formal rules of inclusion or participation (Moulaert,
Rodriguez and Swyngedouw 2003, p. 250). This situation is legitimised by discourses of elite
coalitions (including professional experts) that present the projects as both helping to overcome social
exclusion, and as being essential to maintain urban competitiveness (Moulaert, Rodriguez and
Swyngedouw 2003, pp. 256,259). But the focus on the speculative production of higher land rents
often leads to the creation of islands of wealth in an impoverished environment (Moulaert, Rodriguez
and Swyngedouw 2003, pp. 260).
Redfern-Waterloo Authority and Governance GOVERNANCE 17-2
Governance 1'7
As the new govemance structures are confronted by social protest the structures adjust or transform to
maintain their legitimacy and political support (Moulaert, Rodriguez and Swyngedouw 2003, p. 251).
In the UK, the intractability of many area-based problems to economic-led solutions has led to more
holistic, 'joined-up' governance interventions (Beer et al 2005. p. 50). Similarly, in a number of
western European states. the problem of urban socio-spatial polarisation has been met by new rescaled,
neighbourhood-based responses in the 1990s (Brenner 2004, p. 268).
URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORA nONS IN SYDNEY
The forces leading to the emergence of new urban govemance structures since the 1980s, outlined
above, have been strongly manifested in Sydney through the creation of a number of urban
development corporations (UDCs). However, UDCs in Sydney date to before the 1980s, to Fordist
times, pace the constructions the literature cited above that this is a quintessentially post-Fordist, neo-
liberal phenomenon. An early version of contemporary UDCs, the Sydney Cove Redevelopment
Authority, was set up in the late 1960s. This was intended to increase the values of government harbour
frontage land at the Rocks through redevelopment for offices. The original scheme was thwarted by
strong resident-labour protests and a building union Green Ban (Jakubowicz 1984). In 1974 a prototype
of British New Town development corporations. the Macarthur Development Corporation. was set up
under the Growth Centres Act with special planning and development coordination powers to establish
a new urban sector in south-west Sydney for 500,000 people. The Macarthur Development Corporation
was a late welfare state instrumentality for effecting the implementation of a comprehensive urban
plan.
The first of Sydney's post-Fordist UDCs was the Darling Harbour Authority, modelled on the London
Docklands Development Corporation. The Authority was established in 1984 to redevelop surplus state
government land in Darling Harbour for discretionary consumption. notably gambling. conventions and
exhibitions. This was intended to generate international tourism spending as part of the state
government's strategy to attract global investment and spending in advanced economy sectors to
Sydney (Searle 2002). The Authority was neo-liberal in character. with its own planning and
development approval powers and significant private sector representation, although the state
govermnent itself was managerialist rather than neo-liberal.
After the election of a full-fledged neo-liberal state government in 1988, there was increased use of
public-private partnerships to bring about major urban development projects in Sydney. The most
important of these involved private sector funding of new motorways, the use of reserve planning
powers removing development consent from local councils to the state government to facilitate the
development oflarge-scale 'global' consumption, entertainment and infrastructure facilities such as
the Sydney Casino and Fox Studios (Searle and Bounds 1999). and the establishment offurther UDCs.
The City West Development Corporation was set up in 1992 under the Growth Centres Act to
coordinate the redevelopment ofPynnont and Ultimo. on Sydney Harbour just west of the CBD. The
Corporation was also responsible for master plannmg of significant govemment waterfront land.
intended to revalorise state properties in order to reduce public debt (Searle and Byrne 2002). The
staging of the year 2000 Olympic Games generated emblematic urban development, and special
legislation was enacted (and existing reserve powers applied) to establish the Olympic Coordination
Authority with full control over the development of Olympic facilities. The authority. renamed Sydney
Olympic Park Authority, has been given post-Games responsibility for implementing a master plan to
intensify development around the main Olympic stadiums.
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The construction of the airport-Central line for the Olympic Games provided an opportunity for large
scale urban consolidation to be achieved on old industrial sites around the rail line. To plan and
coordinate development of higher density housing for 25,000 people as well as 15,000 jobs in the zone
around Green Square station, the state government established the South Sydney Development
Corporation in 1996, again using the Growth centres Act. Unlike the City West Development
Corporation areas, the local council in Green Square was allowed to keep basic planning and
development control powers though planing received resources from the government and its land
development agency (Landcom) through the Development Corporation (Searle 2005). The
corporation's powers were constrained so that it operated as one element of a partnership with local and
State government under a joint memorandum of understanding. Larger development applications are
referred by the council to the corporation for review. This partnership arrangement between
Corporation and council responded to criticism of the City West corporation's lack of community
participation, as well as to the control by the ruling state government party (Labor) of local politics
(Searle 2005). While the City West Development Corporation and subsequent development
corporations in South Sydney and Sydney's new outer urban sectors (see below) focusing on residential
development do not appear to directly align with the recent competitive city rationale in Europe for
new state spaces to facilitate major urban development projects (Brenner 2004), they nevertheless
generate the revalorisation that is critical to the success of the new state spaces. Discourses constructed
around the urban consolidation fonn of residential development in particular also legitimate such
development in terms of efficiency and environmental gains that increase Sydney's competitiveness
(Searle 2004).
From the mid 1990s the state government increasingly directed the urban governance of Sydney to the
production of a globally competitive city (McGuirk 2004). This was carried out through the
refashioning of key state agencies to an active partnership with business investors and developers. It
emerged in a number of institutional forms and interventions. One of these was the creation in 2001 by
the state government of the Cooks Cove Development Corporation, once more using the Growth
Centres Act. State intervention to facilitate the development of open space adjacent to Sydney airport
for a 'gateway' high tech manufacturing and export hub had been proposed by a development
company. Creation of the Corporation gave the government the powers necessary to coordinate the
development of a site with a number of state, local government and community land owners. The
Corporation has now prepared a master plan to guide development.
In 2004 the state government announced two new urban development corporations. One was the
Growth Centres Commission. This is to be responsible for the identification of release areas in the two
new urban sectors - northwest and southwest - in the current metropolitan strategy (DIPNR 2005). The
extent to which the Commission's role might be widened to a fuller development corporation role as
envisaged under the Growth Centres Act is uncertain at this stage, although the government's intention
that developers will fund all local infrastructure plus 75 per cent of regional infrastructure (DIPNR
2005, p. 25) suggests that there will be a need for sector-level coordination of infrastructure funding
and provision. The other new corporation announced in 2004 was the Redfern-Waterloo Authority,
discussed in the remainder of this paper.
CONTEXT FOR CREATION OF THE REDFERN-WATERLOO AUTHORITY
The NSW government made it clear that the rationale for establishing the Redfern-Waterloo Authority
(RW A) lay primarily in the need to do something about what it saw as the social problems of this inner
south city area. The Redfern-Waterloo area has traditionally been one of Sydney's poorest. It contained
heavy industries, railway workshops and sweatshops from the late 1800s (Fitzgerald 2005). Later the
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area was also a major source of workers for Sydney's early twentieth century industrial heartland, the
Central Industrial Area immediately to the south. Redfern-Waterloo was the focus of the city's post-
war high rise public housing development. Until recent gentrification incursions, the area provided a
significant supply of cheaper private sector housing in addition to its public housing. It also contains a
small concentration of Aboriginal population around Redfern station, dating back to the pre-war period.
This context has produced a socio-economic structure that contains significant levels of deprivation. In
2001, Waterloo was the fifth poorest of Sydney's 526 suburbs, Twelve per cent of Redfern's
households had incomes below S200 a week. Nearly 60 per cent of Waterloo's residents were
unemployed and were dependent on state welfare benefits (Sa110r 2004). Much of this deprivation was
associated with the concentration of public housing, which represents 50 per cent of Redfern-
Waterloo's total housing stock.
The state government started working towards a strategy to address the housing and related problems
of Waterloo from the early 1990s. Eventually in 2002 the Redfern-Waterloo Partnership Project was set
up under the auspices of the Premiers Department. It aimed to use a whole-of-government approach,
working with the local community, to improve safety, crime prevention, human services and cross-
agency coordination. Nevertheless a review in 2004 concluded that human services were still poorly
coordinated and integrated (Redfern-Waterloo Authority 2005).
The most intense concentration of social problems was at the Block next to Redfem station, where the
Aboriginal Housing Company had bought 102 houses for Aboriginal occupation. By 2004, all but 19 of
these dwellings had been demolished by the Company because they housed drug dealers (Farrelly
2005). A long history of hostile relations between police and the Aboriginal community culminated in a
riot outside Redfern station in February 2004, in which Molotov cocktails were thrown at police ranks.
This flash point engendered a legitimation crisis that challenged the state government's multicultural
and law and order credentials. It was a principal trigger for the formation of the RW A.
While the Redfern riot provoked the government to set up a powerful 'new state space' to address the
underlying causes, other contingent politico-institutional forces were operating in the same direction.
One related to the state government's policy priority to a globally competitive city (McGuirk 2004). In
early 2004 the Department of Infrastructure, Planmng and Natural Resources asked the NSW
Government Architect to prepare a report with recommendations to improve the performance and
viability of the South Sydney Development Corporation, which faced problems in financing
development of a town centre. The report suggested restructuring the corporation, giving it government
land, removing development approval powers from the local council (by now, the City of Sydney), and
extending the corporation's boundaries to include the whole development corridor from Central station
to the airport. The corridor was a significant part of Sydney's 'global arc', generating SI3bn of
Sydney's annual gross domestic product (Dick and Goodsir 2004). The development corridor included
Redfern-Waterloo, The City Council strongly objected to its potential loss of control over development
along the corridor, and the report was withdrawn by the Department (Dick and Goodsir 2004). The
competitive global city rationale for creating the RWA became clearer when background reports were
accessed in late 2004 by the Sydney Morning Herald (see below).
Nevertheless the (Labor) state govemment's relationship with the City Council had become strained
after the government expanded the council's boundaries to include South Sydney, in order to allow
Labor to take control of the council. The election under the new boundaries in 2004 resulted in the
local independent Member of Parliament, Clover Moore, defeating Labor and becoming Lord Mayor.
She had previously had an adversarial relationship with the former independent Lord Mayor, Frank
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Sartor, who by 2004 had entered state parliament as a Labor member and been appointed to the
ministry. The creation of the RWA was seen as achieving the Government Architect's objectives in
regard to the Redfern-Waterloo area, including the recommendation for development corporation
assumption of the City Council's development control powers. It was therefore no surprise that Sartor
was appointed to take ministerial control of the RWA, although his government responsibilities in
biomedical research were also influential given the inclusion of the Australia Technology Park within
the RWA area. A more concrete government rationale for taking development control from the City of
Sydney was its concern that the council would object to greater densities and heights for proposed
developments in the area, and thus reduce development potential (Ryle and Jobson 2004).
The creation of the RW A would also potentially assist the finances of the Australia Technology Park
(ATP) next to Redfern station. The ATP started in the early 1990s on government rail land, but the high
tech crash of 2000 plus an unexpected remediation bill of S8m in a heritage workshop caused the ATP
to run into deficit (Perinotto 2005).
THE REDFERN-WATERLOO AUTHORITY
In late 2004 the state government passed the Redfern-Waterloo Authority Act to set up the RWA.
Minister Sartor explained the Act's principle as being that 'our efforts to renew the communities of
Redfern and Waterloo must be comprehensive' (Sartor 2004). Accordingly, the principal functions of
the Authority would be to promote and undertake the economic development and use of its land,
mcluding the prOVISIOnof infrastructure and improvement of public spaces. In this, the Authority
would 'pursue public-private partnerships' according to the Premier (Carr 2004). A ten year Redfern-
Waterloo Plan would be prepared by the Authority in stages from 2005 to provide the Authority's
vision and framework for development. The Plan will focus on 'using infrastructure and commercial
development as a driver for job creation and providing employment opportunities for local residents'
(Sartor 2004). It will be broader than a standard NSW local environmental plan. with the inclusion of a
jobs plan. a human services plan, and an infrastructure and built environment plan. Cabinet papers
indicated that the government's intention was to double the area's population to 40,000 and to create
20,000 new jobs, as well as give the Sydney CBD room to expand (Jopson, Ryle and Goodsir 2004).
In parallel with the Plan, the RWA would administer the Redfern-Waterloo Partnership Program.
Under the Act, the development of the Plan by the RW A would override normal planning processes
under the main NSW planning act, the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act (EPA Act). with
its provisions for local councils to make and administer plans and development controls for their areas.
In addition, the principal state-owned sites have now been declared 'state significant'. using new
provisions enacted under the EPA Act. These provisions allow development approval on such sites to
be streamlined and to short-circuit normal checks and balances under the EPA Act. and for the Minister
to be the development consent authority. The RWA Act also allows the Authority to override heritage
conservation controls under the Heritage Act. This would allow the RWA to ignore heritage
considerations in redevelopment at Redfern Station. the ATP. and the public housing estates. The
government Justified this takeover of plannmg and development control in the area by arguing that
planning certainty within a strategic planning framework was necessary to maximise social and
economic returns from redevelopment (Jopson, Ryle and Goodsir 2004). To further ensure that the
Redfern-Waterloo Plan's goals are achieved and development maximised, the RWA Act gave the
Authority power to acquire land compulsorily.
It is clear that the RWA's development activities are intended to be self-funding. Cabinet papers
indicated that the market value of developments in the area was almost SSbn, and that almost one-third
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of the land is owned by the state government (Ryle and Jopson 2004a). Development of the principal
state sites to realise income for the Authority will be significantly facilitated by their 'state significant'
status. To sustain the RWA before it generated income from developing public land, the government
gave it an interest-free state loan ofS7.75m. The initial budget requires the RWA to generate
'significant' revenue in its first two years by selling or developing the police station at Redfern and
railway land around the ATP. Minister Sartor now sees this gaol as unrealistic due to public
consultation, contamination and heritage problems. He has requested further loans of S36m and
permission to draw on the budget of the Redfern-Waterloo Partnership project (Dick 2005).
A critical target for redevelopment is the Block. This would increase the value of nearby Redfern rail
station land by 25 to 30 per cent. Without this, commercial development of the station would probably
be impracticable, according to the Department of Commerce (Ryle and Jopson 2004a). Redevelopment
of Redfern station applying 'authority planning rules would generate a profit of nearly S18m for the
government (Ryle and Jopson 2004a). A government strategy paper suggested that such redevelopment
could allow Redfern to emerge as a satellite CBD office centre, relieving CBD congestion. More
generally, the paper saw CBD expansion into Redfern as being needed for Sydney to become 'a key
world city serving the Asia Pacific region' (Jopson and Ryle 2004a). Another strategy paper pointed to
the existing low number of jobs within 500 metres of Redfern station, representing an under-utilisation
of government infrastructure. Taking up such opportunities could allow the area to link in to the
'knowledge economy', given its location within Sydney's 'global are' extending from North Ryde to
the airport. The paper claimed that 'social dislocation' was preventing this (Jopson and Ryle 2004a).
Such arguments constituted a discourse in favour of old-style slum clearances that would not only
reduce 'social dislocation' in modernist planning style, but also yield government profits and a globally
competitive city in post-Fordist planning style. The February 2004 riot and the perceived importance of
Redfern station redevelopment for locking the area into Sydney's global city role meant that the initial
focus would be on redevelopment of the Block. The Aboriginal Housing Company has proposed that
the Block be redeveloped for the Aborigmal community. Architect Col James has worked with the
Company to produce a plan for 62 dwellings, plus an indigenous business college, a market. a museum
and a rebuilt gymnasium, along with a major civic space (James 2005). Sartor has opposed this planned
re-concentration of Aboriginal dwellings saying it would result in a concentration of 'high dependency
tenancies', preferring instead that the 62 tenancies be spread across Redfern-Waterloo (Walker 2005).
He has declared the Block a 'state significant' site, making him the sole development consent authority
(Farrelly 2005).
The scale of the proposed Block redevelopment is dwarfed by proposed redevelopment of the NSW
Department of Housing's 3,519 dwellings, containing 7,000 public tenants. These tenants would be
allowed to stay. Cabinet documents indicate that the government's 23 ha land holdings would be
offered for private development of 6,300 apartments with 12,500 private tenants and owners. This
would be at no cost to the government, with existing limits on floor space in the area cancelled to
provide a development incentive. Revenue from this development would be used to build new public
housing and refurbish existing public stock (Jopson and Ryle 2004b). The aim is to reduce the overall
proportion of public housing in Redfern-Waterloo to 17.5 per cent. Most of the existing high rise public
housing buildings, which represent two-thirds of the public stock, will need to be demolished. These
will be the most difficult to refurbish to current standards and to allow mixing of different types of
residents (Jopson and Ryle 2004b). Public housing residents have protested about the Minister's
powers to demolish their dwellings. All but one City of Sydney councillor supported a motion
condemning the level of urban renewal power given to the Minister under the RW A Act (Pryor 2004).
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A third focus of redevelopment is the Australian Technology Park on former railway workshops site
south of Redfern station. The ATP is seen as the most important site within Sydney for high tech
research, but has not been able to achieve the government's demands for it to be self-funding. The
government is intending that the RW A take over the ATP from the successor agency to the City West
Corporation, and its $38m debt be transferred to the government (Ryle and Jopson 2004b). The ATP
would continue to receive state funding for five more years until it can be financially viable under the
RW A. Cabinet papers indicate that the RWA will review the existing ATP master plan to increase the
area of employment land, and increase floor space ratios for new buildings to achieve viability. The
cabinet papers suggest that this could increase the number of jobs at the site from 6.500 to 15.000 (Ryle
and Jopson 2004b).
REDFERN-WATERLOO AND NEW STATE SPACES
The Redfern-Waterloo Authority represents the most significant 'new state space' in Sydney since the
Darling Harbour Authority was created in the 1980s. It displays the key features of recent new state
spaces in Europe (Brenner 2004): public-private partnership. a new authority not accountable to the
local community. the use of real estate revalorisation to fund redevelopment that will increase city
competitiveness. legitimation via claims that it will address the area's social problems. and the lack of
voice of the local community in the authority's actions. The necessity for a new act of parliament to
establish the powers of the RWA indicates the comprehensive nature of the changes intended by the
government for the area, and the freedom it wanted from normal planning processes and checks under
the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act (EPA Act) (which would have applied had the
Growth Centres Act been used instead).
The local context is significant here. The local community is large, and is strongly supported by the
City Council under its ruling community independents led by Clover Moore. The potential for the
Council to stall proposed developments under the EPA Act in the interests of the community would
have been significant, and had already been demonstrated in this regard in proposals on the rail
workshops site. The increased local government resources now available to Redfern-Waterloo as a
result of the expansion of the City Council boundaries have increased the Council's potential to
strengthen the community and gamer support in return.
In this sense the formation of the RWA represents a step backwards from the model of the
neighbouring South Sydney Development Corporation. The latter was set up under a tri-partite model
in which the Corporation, state government and local government shared tasks under a memorandum of
understanding (Searle 2005). However the SSDC had failed to achieve significant development of
'global city' jobs, while the lack of government land limited its ability to fund 'magnet' infrastructure
such as the town centre. The SSDC thus illustrates the potential contradictions between community
participation and a global city role, a situation recognised on various occasions in the previous decade
by the state government in overriding local participation to achieve global city activity (for example,
see Searle and Bounds 1999). The powers of the RW A act to resolve this contradiction by greatly
reducing the potential for community participation in development decisions. The significant area of
state government land in Redfern-Waterloo increases the state's necessity to reduce participation, in
order to maximise its returns from its own land. Thus the role of 'public' land changes from being a
necessary by-product of the welfare state to being an instrument for capturing global investment profits
and generally facilitating intensification of development. In general, the RWA can be seen as an agency
generated by Sydney's hegemonic discourse of global competitiveness and associated narratives in
favour of accelerated urban development (McGuirk 2004).
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In terms of the 'new state spaces' thesis as put by Brenner (2004). the RWA fits uneasily in one
important respect. The RW A involves a significant state centralisation of authority and power. unlike
the decentralised model that characterises European (and, for that matter. US) new state spaces. Even
the UK, which developed centralised new state spaces such as urban development corporations and
enterprise zones under Thatcher, has now moved to more decentralised variants. This reflects the
traditional meagre powers and resources of local government in Australia. But it also reflects a state
government that seeks to control the political agenda and defuse periodic crises via high visibility
projects that at the same time minimise the call on state funds. In addition, the role of the development
industry as the main source of political donations to the ruling party. Labor, and the industry's calls for
major strategic initiatives by the government to promote development (for example, McGuirk 2004)
also mean the Redfern-Waterloo project generates political capital with a key constituency. In the end.
the role of the state remains critical in post-Fordist urban development, particularly in Sydney as the
Redfem- Waterloo case illustrates.
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